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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Appellant James Crumble (hereinafter Mr. Crumble and/or Appellant)
appeals from a motion to disqualify a judge for cause.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
This is the second appeal in this case which has long and tortured history.
The case began in 2005 and the guilty plea was entered pre-Estrada. 1
Fortunately, the state succinctly summarized the original proceedings in its brief
in the prior appeal. 2 As the state explained in its brief:
Forty-five-year-old Crumble had sexual intercourse with twelve-year
old S.M. "at least three times weekly" over a six-month period.
(Polygraph; Bonner County Sheriff's Report, p.31, attached to PSI.)
As a result of the sexual abuse, S.M. became pregnant with
Crumble's child. (Bonner County Sheriffs Report, p.34; 6/5/06 Tr.,
p.22, Ls.20-23.)
Crumble later broke in to the garage of Angela Rogers on two
separate occasions, stealing items valued at over $3000. (PSI, p.2;
Bonner County Sheriffs Report, p.6.)
The state charged Crumble with burglary in case number 33625
and rape, with a persistent violator enhancement, in case number
33627. (R., pp.22-25, 138-39, 224-25.) Crumble initially pied guilty
to burglary and felony assault with attempt to commit a serious
felony, pursuant to a plea agreement. (R., pp.56-58, 165-67.) At
the time of the plea, the district court reserved the right to withdraw
from the agreement in the event that the presentence investigation
report showed that the interests of justice would not be served by
the agreement. (12/09/05 Tr., p.57, Ls.16-20.) Following its review
of the presentence report, the psychological evaluation, the
psychosexual evaluation, and the victim impact statements, the
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Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 33 (2006).

On October 4, 2011, this Court entered its order taking judicial notice of the
prior appeal in Docket No. 33625/33627.

2
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district court determined the interests of justice would not be served
by the agreement and allowed Crumble to withdraw his guilty pleas.
(06/05/06 Tr., p.36, L.23 - p.36, L.6; p.39, Ls.16-24.)
Pursuant to a revised plea agreement, the state amended the rape
to lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen years and dismissed the
persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.98-101, 226-31.) Crumble
pied guilty to the amended charges and to the burglary. (R., pp.98101, 226-31.) The district court imposed concurrent unified
sentences of life, with twenty years fixed, for the lewd conduct with
a minor under sixteen, and ten years, with five years fixed, for the
burglary. (R., pp.102-08, 232-38.) Crumble filed notices of appeal in
both cases, timely from the orders of judgment and commitment.
(R., pp.110-12, 118-20, 240, 248-50.) The cases were consolidated
on appeal. (R., pp. 126-256.)
Respondent's brief, No. 33625 & 33627, p. 1-3.
To further explain,

at the original change of plea hearing, the Rule 11

plea bargain provided that Mr. Crumble would plead guilty to the amended
charge of assault with the intent to commit a serious felony and burglary, that the
sentences would run concurrently, and that there was no limitation on sentence
recommendation. (R. p. 33. 3)

The court agreed to bind itself unless the PSI

shows that justice would not be served by such an agreement and reserved the
right to withdraw any Rule 11 approval. (R. p. 34.)

Mr. Crumble was advised

that each of the offenses carried a maximum sentence of 10 years. (R. p. 34.)
Mr. Crumble then pied guilty and the court accepted the guilty pleas. (R. p. 31.)
At the sentencing, the court rejected the Rule 11 plea bargain (after which
Mr. Crumble withdrew his guilty pleas), stating as follows:
Under these circumstances based on what has been presented and
based upon the Presentence Investigation and based upon the
report of Dr. Timlin based upon the report of Thomas Hearn based

3

Since there are two consolidated cases, many of the pleadings appear in our
record twice, but Appellant will only cite to one location for each in the record.
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on the psychosexual assessment testing results at this time I will
not agree to be bound to concurrent sentences under these
circumstances.
Tr. 6/5/2006, p. 35, In. 23-p. 36, In. 4 (emphasis added). (R. p. 28.)
Again, after a revised plea bargain, Mr. Crumble was sentenced to life in
prison with the first 20 years fixed, rather than the 10 years which was the
maximum sentence he could have received under the original plea bargain. An
appeal of the sentence followed, which was affirmed by the Idaho Court of
Appeals in an unpublished opinion.
Mr. Crumble then brought a petition for post conviction relief. (R. p. 131.)
While it was pending, he also brought in the criminal case, a motion to disqualify
the judge for cause and also, a motion to withdraw guilty plea. (R. p. 76-77, 8081.) The basis for the motion to disqualify for cause was that the judge was
exposed to and a made a decision based on extra-judicial information, to wit, the
psychosexual evaluation that it would not have received had Mr. Crumble been
properly advised of his Fifth Amendment right to not participate in a
psychosexual evaluation. (R. p. 78-79.)

The court denied the motion to

disqualify, holding that Estrada could not be applied retroactively. (R. p. 100.)
The court never ruled on the motion to withdraw guilty plea.
Then, various procedural machinations transpired which are not relevant
here. Ultimately,

the judgments in the criminal cases were reentered to allow

Mr. Crumble to bring another direct appeal in the criminal cases.

(R. p. 131.)

Appellant timely filed notices of appeal in the criminal cases. (R. p. 133.)
This Court entered its order consolidating appeals on January 6, 2012.

3

ISSUE

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION
TO DISQUALIFY BECAUSE IT APPLIED THE WRONG LAW

4

ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY BECAUSE IT APPLIED THE WRONG LAW

A.

Standard of review
The standard of review of a motion to disqualify a judge for cause is abuse

of discretion. Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482 (Ct.App. 2008).
As the Court of Appeals explained in State v. Lippert, 276 P.3d 756 (Ct.
App. 2012):
When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal,
the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1)
whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries
of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards
applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the
lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
Id., p. 759.

B.

The motion to disqualify and the court's ruling
To begin with, the rule governing disqualification of a judge for cause,

I.C.R. 25, provides in relevant part:
(b) Disqualification for cause.
Any party to an action may disqualify a judge or magistrate from
presiding in any action upon any of the following grounds:

5

(4) That judge or magistrate is biased or prejudiced for or against
any party or that party's case in the action.
(c) Motion for disqualification.
Any such disqualification for cause shall be made by a motion to
disqualify accompanied by an affidavit of the party or that party's
attorney stating distinctly the grounds upon which disqualification is
based and the facts relied upon in support of the motion. Such
motion for disqualification for cause may be made at any time. The
presiding judge or magistrate sought to be disqualified shall grant
or deny the motion for disqualification upon notice and hearing in
the manner prescribed by these rules for motions.
I.C.R. 25 (emphasis added).
Mr. Crumble first brought a pro se motion for disqualification of judge
pursuant to I.C.R. 25(b)(4) and also filed a combined affidavit in support of it and
his motion to withdraw guilty plea. (R. p. 35-36, 42-44.) The motion for
disqualification was based on the court's rejection of the guilty plea because the
judge was prejudiced and showed bias after he reviewed the presentence report
and psychosexual evaluation. (R. p. 36.)
The court denied the motion for disqualification as follows:
The Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Elliott, 126 Idaho 323, 882
P.2d 978 (Ct. App.1994) stated:
Disposition of such motions is within the sound discretion of
the trial court. Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 206, 731 P.2d
192, 201 (1986); State v. Saunders, 124 Idaho 334, 336, 859
P.2d 370, 372 (Ct. App. 1993). A motion for disqualification
should be granted only where there is actual prejudice
against the litigant of such a nature as to render it
improbable that the presiding judge could or would give the
litigant a fair and impartial trial. Id., citing State v. Waterman,
36 Idaho 259, 210 P. 208 (1922); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho
742,776,810 P.2d 680, 714 (1991).
To be disqualifying, the bias or prejudice "must stem from an
extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on

6

some basis other than what the judge learned from his
participation in the case." Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120
Idaho 27, 29, 813 P.2d 366, 368 (Ct. App. 1991), quoting
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583, 16 L. Ed.
2d 778, 86 S. Ct. 1698 (1966). Therefore, conclusions about
the character of a defendant or the merits of his defense
which arose during the trial and are based upon the
evidence or the defendant's behavior are not a basis for
disqualification.
It follows that, in order to prevail on his motion, Elliott must
show that the district judge harbored preconceived
conclusions or attitudes about Elliott's case and that this bias
was based upon information from an extrajudicial source.
Id. at 329, 882 P.2d at 984. (Footnote omitted).

In this case, Mr. Crumble's allegations of bias are based upon the
judge's refusal, after reviewing the presentence investigation report,
and psychological and psychosexual assessment testing, to
approve of the concurrent sentences set forth in the plea
agreement.
To prevail on his motion, Mr. Crumble must show that the judge's
rejection of the concurrent sentences in the plea agreement was
based upon preconceived conclusions or attitudes about the case
derived from information from an extrajudicial source, and not from
information the judge learned from participation in the case. The
information provided in Mr. Crumble's motion and supporting
affidavit fails to meet this burden.
Order Denying Disqualification of Judge, 1/13/2010, p. 2. (R. p. 46.)
Mr. Crumble then filed an objection to the denial of his motion arguing in
part, that the court failed to hold a hearing on the matter and requested a
hearing. (R. p. 61-62, 63.)
In the meantime, the court had appointed counsel for Mr. Crumble. (R. p.
49.) Counsel brought a motion to disqualify judge for cause pursuant to I.C.R.
(b)(4). (R. p. 76.) In the accompanying affidavit of counsel, it explained that the
judge was prejudiced against the defendant by information it had before it only

7

because Mr. Crumble's rights pursuant to Estrada v. State were not honored. (R.
p. 78-79.)

In short, the court was in possession of (extrajudicial) prejudicial

information which was used against him for the purposes of sentencing as was
demonstrated by the sentence he received. (R. p. 79.)
At the hearing on this motion, appointed counsel explained that the basis
of the motion was that Mr. Crumble was not advised by his trial counsel about his

Estrada rights, to wit, that he had the right to remain silent and not participate in
the psychosexual evaluation. Rather, the court ordered
participate

Mr. Crumble to

in the psychosexual and psychological evaluation. Had trial counsel

properly advised Mr. Crumble that he had the right to remain silent, then the
court would not have been exposed to the additional material that caused the
court to reject the Rule 11 plea agreement.
received

Thus, the information the court

was from an extrajudicial source, rather than from what the judge

learned from his participation in the case. (Tr. 4/22/2010, p. 3-4.) Accordingly,
counsel requested the court reconsider its denial of the motion to disqualify for
cause because it was exposed to information that it would not have been had
Mr. Crumble received appropriate counsel. (Id. p. 5.)
The state's argument in response was largely nonsensical, but it appears
it was

merely arguing that the claim for disqualification

was inappropriate

without coherently explaining why. (Id.)
The court stated that this was a unique issue and took it under
advisement. (Id. p. 5-6.)
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The court issued a written order, which provided as follows in relevant
part:
On the first issue of the violation of Mr. Crumble's rights pursuant to
Estrada, the defense made no objection to the materials or
information provided to the Court for the purpose of sentencing.
Also, the Idaho Supreme Court recently held that the rule in
Estrada does not have retroactive effect:
[W]e note, admittedly by way of dicta, that we agree with the
district court's conclusion that Estrada did not announce a
new rule of law. As the district court observed, we stated in
Estrada that our earlier "decisions clearly indicate that both
at the point of sentencing and earlier, for purposes of a
psychological evaluation, a defendant's Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination applies." 143 Idaho at
563, 149 P.3d at 838 (emphasis added). It is our view,
therefore, that Estrada did not announce a new rule of law
entitled to retroactive effect.

Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 46, 218 P.3d 388, 390 (2009).
On the second issue, Mr. Crumble stated in his pro se Motion to
Disqualify that the record clearly supported his claim of prejudice
and bias, and he neither requested nor noticed the motion for a
hearing.
NOW, THEREFORE, because Estrada does not have retroactive
effect, and the evidence provided in the second motion to disqualify
and supporting affidavit does not show that the judge harbored any
prejudice or bias against Mr. Crumble "based upon information from
an extrajudicial source, the Court DENIES the Motion to Disqualify.
Order Denying Disqualification of Judge, 4/26/2010, p. 2. (R. p. 99-100.)

C.

The court erred in denying the motion for disqualification
The court denied the motion for the reason that Estrada did not apply

retroactively and so therefore the judge did not make a decision based on
extrajudicial

information.

However,

the

9

court's

ruling

was

based

on

a

misunderstanding about what retroactivity

means in the context in which the

Idaho Supreme Court was discussing it.
The court was correct that the Idaho Supreme Court indicated (in dicta) in

Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44 (2009), that Estrada did not announce a new rule
of law entitled to retroactive effect. The meaning of this was explained by the
Idaho Court of Appeals in Kriebel v. State, 148 Idaho 188 (Ct. App. 2009):
Finally, we conclude that Kriebel was not entitled to equitable tolling
due to his contention that the Supreme Court's decision in Estrada
announced a new, retroactively applicable rule, thus tolling the
statute of limitations until at least November 2007. For a
constitutional rule to apply retroactively, it must first be determined
that the rule is "new." Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416, 127
S. Ct. 1173, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2007); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,
301, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989) (plurality opinion). A
new rule is one not dictated by precedent existing at the time a
judgment became final. Whorton, 549 U.S. at 416; Butler v.
McKelfar, 494 U.S. 407,110 S. Ct. 1212, 108 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1990);
Teague, 489 U.S. at 311; In re Gafford, 127 Idaho 472,476 n.1,
903 P.2d 61, 65 n.1 (1995). A case will be deemed to have
announced a new rule if its outcome "was susceptible to debate
among reasonable minds." Butler, 494 U.S. at 415; Gafford, 127
Idaho at 476 n.1, 903 P.2d at 65 n.1. The explicit overruling of an
earlier holding no doubt creates a new rule. Whorton, 549 U.S. at
416.
If a case is deemed to have announced a new rule, it will apply
retroactively in a collateral proceeding only if (1) the rule is
substantive or (2) the rule is a "watershed rule of criminal
procedure" implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of
the criminal proceeding. Whorton, 549 U.S. at 416 (citing Teague,
489 U.S. at 311). See also Gafford, 127 Idaho at 476, 903 P.2d at
65 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 106 L.
Ed. 2d 256 (1989)).
While Kriebel argues that Estrada announced a new, retroactively
applicable rule, recently the Idaho Supreme Court stated, in dicta,
that Estrada did not announce a "new" rule. Vavold v. State,
Idaho, 218 P.3d 388, 2009 Ida. LEXIS 143, *7 (2009). The court,
while affirming the appellant's petition for post-conviction relief on
appellate procedural grounds, provided the following guidance:
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[W]e note, admittedly by way of dicta, that we agree with the
district court's conclusion that Estrada did not announce a
new rule of law. As the district court observed, we stated in
Estrada that our earlier "decisions clearly indicate that both
at the point of sentencing and earlier, for purposes of a
psychological evaluation, a defendant's Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination applies." 143 Idaho at
563, 149 P.3d at 838 (emphasis added). It is our view,
therefore, that Estrada did not announce a new rule of law
entitled to retroactive effect.
Vavold, at *8.

Idaho at -

, 218 P.3d at 390, 2009 Ida. LEXIS 143

Thus, given this clear direction from our Supreme Court, we
conclude that Kriebel's post-conviction petition was untimely,
because the post-conviction statute of limitations could not have
been tolled on the basis that Estrada announced a new,
retroactively applicable rule.
Id. p. 191 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the statement that Estrada does not apply retroactively
means that it cannot be applied in a collateral proceeding, such as a petition for
post conviction relief or a federal habeas proceeding.
In our case, Mr. Crumble was not asserting that Estrada should apply in a
collateral proceeding, rather, he asserted that it should apply in his original
criminal case. 4
Therefore, the court erred because it misunderstood the meaning of
retroactivity and applied it incorrectly. This is in itself an abuse of discretion and
so the order denying the motion for disqualification for cause must be reversed
for this reason alone and remanded so that the court can apply the correct law.

Incidentally, Appellant points out that his criminal case is still not final, since the
instant direct appeal is still pending. Also, I.C.R. 25 expressly provides that the
motion to disqualify may be brought at any time.

4
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Next, Appellant points out that the district court may have applied the
wrong law to the merits of the motion to disqualify as well.
The court stated in its second order denying disqualification of judge:
To prevail on that motion, Mr. Crumble was required to show that
the judge's alleged prejudice or bias in rejecting the concurrent
sentences in the plea agreement was based upon "preconceived
conclusions or attitudes about [Crumble's] case and that this bias
was based upon information from an extrajudicial source." State v.
Elliott, 126 Idaho 323, 329, 882 P.2d 978, 984 (Ct. App.1994).
Order Denying Disqualification of Judge 4/26/2010, p. 1. (R. p. 98.)
However, Appellant points out that shortly before this order issued, the
Idaho Supreme Court in a civil case rejected this standard, at least as it applies
in I.C.R.P. 40, as was explained in Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re

Doe), 150 Idaho 752 (Ct. App. 2011):
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(2)(A)(4) provides for
disqualification for cause if the presiding judge is "biased or
prejudiced for or against any party or the case in the action." In
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583, 86 S. Ct. 1698,
16 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that
to be disqualifying, the alleged bias or prejudice "must stem from an
extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some
basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the
case." For a number of years Idaho appellate courts followed the
Grinnell standard. [internal citations omitted] However, both the
United States Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme Court have
abandoned this approach. In Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,
114 S. Ct. 1147, 127 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1994), the Court held that "[t]he
fact that an opinion held by a judge derives from a source outside
judicial proceedings is not a necessary condition for 'bias or
prejudice' recusal, since predispositions developed during the
course of a trial will sometimes (albeit rarely) suffice. Nor is it a
sufficient condition for 'bias or prejudice' recusal, since some
opinions acquired outside the context of judicial proceedings (for
example, the judge's view of the law acquired in scholarly reading)
will not suffice." Id. at 554 (emphasis in original). Recently, in Bach
v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 229 P.3d 1146 (2010), the Idaho
Supreme Court, following the reasoning of Liteky, implicitly
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overruled the prior Idaho cases. Our Supreme Court held that
whatever the source of the bias or prejudice, it must be "so extreme
as to display clear inability to render fair judgment," that "unless
there is a demonstration of 'pervasive bias' derived either from an
extrajudicial source or facts and events occurring at trial, there is no
basis for judicial recusal." Id. at 791-92, 229 P.3d at 1153-54
(emphasis added). The Court stated that "the standard for recusal
of a judge, based simply on information that he has learned in the
course of judicial proceedings, is extremely high." Id. at 792, 229
P.3d at 1154.
Id., p. 764-765 (footnotes omitted).

Again, as mentioned above, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted the new
standard in a civil case. Appellant is unaware of its application in a published
criminal case (as opposed to a petition for post conviction relief, which is of
course a civil case). In the event that the standard has also changed for criminal
cases then this matter should be remanded so that the district court can apply
the new standard, although Appellant asserts this is really not necessary since
regardless of the standard, the motion for disqualification for cause should have
been granted.
As argued below, the court had before it extrajudicial information, to wit,
the psychosexual evaluation, which it would not had if defense counsel would
have advised Mr. Crumble of his right to remain silent and that he did not have to
submit to a psychosexual evaluation (rather than being ordered to participate).
In other words, the court had information before it that it would not have learned
from its participation in the case had Mr. Crumble's Estrada rights been honored.
Next, it is undisputable that the court demonstrated 'pervasive bias' from
an extrajudicial source against Mr. Crumble since the court expressly rejected
the Rule 11 plea agreement that provided for concurrent sentences based on the
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psychosexual evaluation. Further, that pervasive bias resulted in a far greater
sentence.

Under the original plea agreement Mr. Crumble had a maximum

exposure of 10 years, whereas after the court was exposed to the extrajudicial
material, he was ultimately sentenced to life in prison with 20 years fixed.
Accordingly, Appellant asserts that the motion disqualifying the judge for
cause should have been granted and that this Court should reverse the order
and remand this matter for further proceeding before a different district judge. But
further, Appellant asserts that since he was sentenced by a biased judge whose
bias arose through his exposure to extrajudicial information, that his convictions
must also be vacated and that he be allowed to reenter his original guilty plea
and be sentenced pursuant to it.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Crumble first requests this Court vacate his convictions and remand
this matter for reentry of his original guilty plea and a resentencing before a
different district judge. Alternatively, Mr. Crumble requests that the order denying
motion for disqualification be reversed and this matter be remanded for further
proceedings before a different district judge. As a last alternative, Mr. Crumble
requests this Court reverse the order denying the motion for disqualification and
remand this matter so that the court can apply the correct law in regards to the
motion.

.
,n

DATED this

.>

l ()k

L

day of September, 2012.
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